papers

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metaethics (comments appreciated)

'Correctly Responding to Reasons and Internalism about Rationality' (pdf, 22 pages with references)

• Many discussions in the literature assume that at least part of being rational has to do with correctly responding to (objective) normative reasons. Surprisingly, then, most explicit discussions of the requirements of rationality conclude that no part of rationality has anything to do with correctly responding to (objective) normative reasons. I will challenge the conclusions of these explicit discussions here. First, I will identify a common source of motivation for denying that part of rationality has something to do with correctly responding to (objective) normative reasons. This common motivation involves cases with a particular structure that put intuitive adequacy constraints on theories of rationality. In the first half of the paper I show that it’s possible to meet these adequacy constraints while still holding that part of rationality has to do with correctly responding to (objective) normative reasons. Most theorists cannot hold this view because they are committed to internalism about rationality, which is the thesis that if A and B are internal twins, A is rational iff B is rational. In the second half of the paper, I argue that internalism is false. Along the way, I provide support for a type of externalism that meshes well with the alternate schema introduced in the first part of the paper. I will thus conclude that rationality has something to do with correctly responding to reasons. 

'On Maximal Rationality' (down for revisions)

• Despite the common divorce of one’s rational status and the set of one’s reasons, philosophers have been slow to analyze exactly what is required of an agent in order to be immune from rational criticism. In this paper, I argue for a theory that aims at telling us what it takes. First, though, I argue against a very popular view of what substantive rationality is. On this view, substantive rationality is not relevantly similar to procedural rationality. This common view holds that substantive rationality is merely the set of which reasons you have. Thus, if you do not act in accordance with substantive rationality, you aren’t necessarily criticizable. I argue that we should think of substantive rationality as relevantly similar to procedural rationality. In the second half of the paper, I argue for my theory of maximal rationality, which aims at providing a conceptual analysis of the ‘realm of criticizability.’ 

'Dancy On Acting for the Right Reason' (pdf, 5 pages with references)

• It is a truism that agents can do the right action for the right reason. To put the point in terms more familiar to ethicists, it is a truism that one’s motivating reason can be one’s normative reason. In this short note, I will argue that Jonathan Dancy’s preferred view about how this is possible faces a trilemma. Either it doesn’t fulfill two plausible constraints on such a view or it falls prey to the an objection Dancy levels against a rival view, or he must give up his most central tenant. Finally, at the end, I will suggest an easy solution that yields a view similar to Dancy’s that avoids the trilemma.
  

'A Defense of The Factoring Account of the Having Reasons Relation' (pdf, 13 pages with references)

•  It’s natural to say that when I ought to ϕ, I have reasons to ϕ.  That is, there are reasons for ϕ-ing, and moreover, I have some of them.  Mark Schroeder calls this view The Factoring Account of the having reasons relation.  He thinks The Factoring Account is false. In this paper, I defend The Factoring Account.  Not only do I provide intuitive support for the view, but I also defend it against Schroeder’s criticisms.  Moreover, I show that it helps us understand the requirements of substantive rationality, or what we are rationally required to do when responding to reasons.  
  

'Belief, Evidence, and Practical Reasons' (pdf, 27 pages with references)

• My argument here will be two-fold. First, I will argue for a certain connection between theoretical rationality and practical reasons. My argument will depend on what I take to be a truism of theoretical rationality: believe (at least some of) the propositions that your evidence decisively supports. I will argue that this truism, if taken seriously, will generate a very strong pro tanto practical reason. The arguments for this conclusion will form the basis for the paper’s second main aim, which is to argue against certain conceptions of practical reasons. The practical reason supported by our theoretical truism, although prima facie very plausible, will not be supported in the right way by the teleological conception of practical reasons. This is telling against that theory, I will argue.

epistemology

See 'Correctly Responding to Reasons and Internalism about Rationality,' 'On Maximal Rationality,' 'A Defense of The Factoring Account of the Having Reasons Relation' and 'Belief, Evidence, and Practical Reasons' above.

See 'Common Sense, Reliability, and Luminosity in Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument' below

'Justification, E=(PT)K, and Internalism' (in draft)

• In this paper, I expand on some of the implications of my theory of maximal rationality. In particular, I argue that one is epistemically justified in believing p just in case one knows that one has decisive reason to believe that p. If this is the correct conception of epistemic justification, then a necessary condition for some proposition being part of some agent's evidence is that that agent is in a position to know that proposition. Moreover, if this is the correct account of justification, then internalism about justification is false.
  

'Why Knowledge is (Kinda, Sorta) the Aim of Belief (and Assertion Too!)' (in draft)

• I argue here that the account of justification elucidated in "Justification, E=(PT)K, and Internalism" can explain why we take knowledge as the aim of belief and assertion. Specifically, I will argue that because justification cannot be plausibly laid out without reference to knowledge, knowledge is essential to believing. In other words, since what we are doing when seeking justification is seeking knowledge, it follows that what we are doing simpliciter when believing is seeking knowledge. We are, in effect, attempting to transmit the status of knowledge from things we know to new beliefs. Likewise, when we assert propositions, we are attempting to transmit knowledge from those who know to new believers.
  

'The Gradability of 'Justified' and Contextualism about Knowledge' (in draft)

• Some contextualists about knowledge (espcially Cohen (1999)) argue that the context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions boils down to the gradability of the word 'justified'. Although this defense of contextualism has been offered, its semantic merits haven't been fully explored. In this paper, I will explore such merits in light of Kennedy's (2007) semantics of gradable adjectives. I will conclude that although it is plausible to think that 'justified' is gradable, it does not follow that knowledge-attributions are context sensitive. In order to justify that further claim one must also posit that 'know' is gradable, which it clearly is not.
  

normative ethics

'Contractualism, Basic Aggregation, and Varied Ills Aggregation: A Defense'

• Abstract and paper coming soon! For a preview (i.e., the first half of the paper) see "Contractualism and Basic Aggregation: A Defense" below.

'Contractualism and Basic Aggregation: A Defense' (11 pages with references; pdf)

• T.M. Scanlon’s contractualism aims at providing a plausible non-consequentialist theory of ‘what we owe to each other’. One way he tries to achieve this aim is by adopting an individualist restriction, which limits the considerations that can ground reasonable rejections. One such consideration is aggregation. By adopting such a restriction, Scanlon seems to place himself in a bad position in cases where you have a choice of saving a larger group or a smaller group. Scanlon argues that his theory can handle these cases in a plausible way. Specifically, he thinks that his theory requires one to save the larger group. Many people have criticized his argument for this conclusion. In this paper, I defend contractualism against three of the most prominent objections. I argue that once we understand what counts as a reasonable rejection and what type of aggregative concerns are barred by the individualist restriction, the objections will be shown to not be cogent.

political philosophy

'Contractualism, Respect, and Freedom of Expression' (pdf, 23 pages with references)

• One prevalent view in political philosophy holds that the only justified principles are those that can be agreed to by all citizens. Another popular view is that we ought to respect people, not because of what they do, but because of what they are—viz., people. In this paper, I intend to defend a robust right to free expression. I will anchor this defense in these two familiar ideas. The resulting theory, I will argue, is a powerful one. It can provide us with a unified view of free expression while not only conforming to our intuitions, but also explaining our intuitions.

philosophy of language

See 'The Gradability of 'Justified' and Contextualism about Knowledge' above.

'Contextualism or Relativism? Truth-Value Determination, Sorites Arguments, and Absolute Gradable Adjectives' (pdf, 21 pages with references)

• One strategy to try to explain the paradoxical nature of sorites arguments is to argue for a semantics of gradable adjectives that explicates some relevant feature of all (vague) gradable adjectives that gives rise to the paradox. A semantic theory that did that would have a serious consideration in its favor. One recent foray into this game can be found in Kennedy (2007). Kennedy defends a contextualist semantics of gradable adjectives. He argues that his theory can explain the paradoxical nature of sorites arguments containing gradable adjectives. Given certain background assumptions, it seems as if he successfully carries out the strategy. However, at least one of those background assumptions is tendentious. Namely, he assumes what has come to be known epistemicism about vagueness. We might wonder, then, if there is another theory of gradable adjectives that explains the sorites paradox without assuming epistemicism. I will argue here that there is: viz., a relativistic one. I will argue that relativism about gradable adjectives akin to Richard’s (2004) view can equally or better explain everything that Kennedy’s theory does without assuming epistemicism.